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RECENT
DEVELOPMENT
Limiting the Application of the
Exclusionary Rule: The Good Faith
Exception
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court in 1914 adopted the exclu-
sionary rule for federal trials. That rule requires the exclusion of
evidence seized in violation of a criminal defendant's fourth
amendment' right to freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures.' Nearly fifty years later, the Court extended the exclu-
sionary rule to the states.8 During the first sixty years of the rule's
existence, the Court advanced several justifications for withholding
such improperly seized evidence from the trier of fact. Among
these reasons was the need to deter unlawful police conduct by re-
moving the incentive to violate the fourth amendment.5
In United States v. Calandra" six members of the Court
agreed that "the rule is a judicially created remedy designed to
safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deter-
rent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved."'7 Since Calandra the Court, in deciding whether to ex-
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
2. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
3. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
4. For a discussion of the purposes of the exclusionary rule, see text accompanying
notes 14-16, 26-27 infra. See also Cann & Egbert, The Exclusionary Rule: Its Necessity in
Constitutional Democracy, 23 How. L.J. 299 (1980); Schlesinger & Wilson, Property, Pri-
vacy and Deterrence: The Exclusionary Rule in Search of a Rationale, 18 DuQ. L. Rv. 225
(1980). See generally 1 W. LAFAv, SEARCH AND SmzuR, A TREATISE ON THE FoURT
AazNnDs r § 1.1 (1978).
5. See text accompanying note 26 infra.
6. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
7. Id. at 348.
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tend the exclusionary rule to a given new context, has balanced the
costs to society of suppressing relevant evidence against the possi-
ble deterrent value of the rule." When a court engages in such bal-
ancing, its view of the exclusionary rule's efficacy as a deterrent
necessarily plays a large part in determining the outcome. Recent
Supreme Court cases indicate skepticism about the rule's deterrent
value, and the Court has declined several opportunities to increase
the scope of the rule.'
The Fifth Circuit in United States v. Williams,'° recently
adopted an exception to the exclusionary rule based in part on the
court's view that the rule does not always operate as a deterrent.
The Williams court held that unconstitutionally seized evidence is
admissible at trial provided that the government official who seized
the evidence acted pursuant to a reasonable, good faith belief that
his conduct was lawful.1 The Fifth Circuit is thus the first circuit
to adopt such a "good faith" exception, and its holding may reflect
an implicit determination that the exclusionary rule is never an
effective deterrent.
In light of the Fifth Circuit's holding, this Recent Develop-
ment examines the exclusionary rule balancing test, emphasizing
the Supreme Court's treatment of the rule's deterrent value, and
suggests an approach to the question whether the exclusionary rule
would deter unlawful police conduct in the good faith exception
setting. The Recent Development argues that because of inconclu-
sive empirical studies and dangers in administration, courts should
not limit the application of the exclusionary rule based solely on
doubts about its deterrent value.
8. See notes 42-49 infra and accompanying text.
9. Id.
10. 622 F.2d 830 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc).
11. Id. at 846-47. This holding appeared in Part II of the Fifth Circuit's en bane deci-
sion. Although a sixteen member majority in Part I of the court's decision found that the
evidence was lawfully obtained and did not address the good faith exception, id. at 839, Part
II (a thirteen member majority) announced:
Henceforth in this circuit, when evidence is sought to be excluded because of po-
lice conduct leading to its discovery, it will be open to the proponent of the evidence to
urge that the conduct in question, if mistaken or unauthorized, was yet taken in a
reasonable, good-faith belief that it was proper. If the court so finds, it shall not apply
the exclusionary rule to the evidence.
[Vol. 34:213214
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II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
A. The Purposes of the Rule
Weeks v. United States12 held that when a criminal defendant
makes a timely motion to have unconstitutionally seized evidence
returned to him, the evidence must be returned and cannot be
used against him in a federal criminal trial.' s Although the lan-
guage in Weeks suggests that the decision could have been based
upon a privacy right,14 a property right,' 5 or the imperative of judi-
cial integrity served by the Court's refusal to sanction unconstitu-
tional police practices,'6 the need to deter such police conduct was
not specifically mentioned as a basis for the decision.
In Wolf v. Colorado7 the Court applied the fourth amend-
ment to the states, but refused to extend the exclusionary rule to
them.18 After Wolf, however, the Court confronted several cases in
which state officers had committed serious fourth amendment vio-
lations.19 One instance of state police conduct that "shock[ed] the
conscience" of the Court prompted the exclusion of illegally ob-
tained evidence;20 other violations, arguably just as shocking, did
12. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
13. Id. at 398.
14. In Weeks a public official had seized defendant's private papers, but it is unclear
whether this fact was necessary to the Court's decision. In the first case that prompted the
Court to analyze closely the fourth amendment, Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886),
the Court had asserted that "we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of a man's
private books and papers to be used in evidence aginst him is substantially different from
compelling him to be a witness against himself." Id. at 633 (emphasis added). The Court's
tendency in the early fourth amendment cases to stress the privacy of a person's belongings
indicates that the Court may have been concerned with a privacy right.
15. See Schlesinger & Wilson, supra note 4. These authors argue that in its inception
the exclusionary rule was designed to protect property rights and that the Court should
return to that approach.
16. The Court in Weeks asserted that "[t]he tendency of those who execute the crimi-
nal laws of the country to obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures ... should find
no sanction in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times with the support
of the Constitution." 232 U.S. at 392. See text accompanying note 27 infra for a discussion
of a case in which the Court explicitly termed this purpose "the imperative of judicial
integrity."
17. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
18. The Court in Wolf emphasized the fact that since Weeks a majority of the states
had refused to adopt the exclusionary rule for state court proceedings. The Wolf Court de-
termined that the states should be allowed to enforce the fourth amendment through their
own selected means. Id. at 29-33.
19. See, e.g., Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S.
165 (1952).
20. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952). In Rochin the state officers forced defen-
dant to submit to having his stomach pumped. Id. at 166.
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not.21
The disparity between state and federal treatment of fourth
amendment infringements, exemplified in the "shocking viola-
tions" cases, 22 led the Court to reassess the application of the ex-
clusionary rule in the early 1960s. In Elkins v. United States23 the
Court discarded the "silver platter doctrine." Under that principle,
evidence seized unconstitutionally by state officers was admissible
in federal court, provided that federal officials did not take part in
the unconstitutional search and seizure-in other words, provided
that the evidence was handed to the federal officials on a "silver
platter."'2 ' Elkins overruled this doctrine because it frustrated the
purposes of the exclusionary rule.2 5 According to the Elkins Court,
one of those purposes is "to deter-to compel respect for the con-
stitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by re-
moving the incentive to disregard it."126 A second purpose of the
exclusionary rule advanced by the Court in Elkins is the "impera-
tive of judicial integrity," which prohibits a court from becoming
an accomplice in the disobedience of the Constitution. 7
The gap between state and federal treatment of fourth amend-
ment violations was narrowed further in Mapp v. Ohio,28 in which
the Court held that the exclusionary rule applies to the states
through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.'
The exclusionary rule, the Court reasoned, must be binding on the
states in order to prevent the fourth amendment from becoming a
mere "form of words."30 Speaking for the Court, Justice Clark as-
serted that the exclusionary rule is "part and parcel of the Fourth
Amendment's limitation upon federal encroachment of individual
privacy" and is "an essential part of both the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments."3 1 The two justifications for the exclusionary
21. See Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 433 (1957) (Court admitted evidence ob-
tained from blood test performed on unconscious defendant).
22. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
23. 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
24. Id. at 208. See generally 1 W. LAFAvE, supra note 4, at § 1.3(c).
25. 364 U.S. at 221-24.
26. Id. at 217.
27. Id. at 222-23.
28. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
29. Id. at 655, 660.
30. 367 U.S. at 655.
31. Id. at 651, 657. Although in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), the Court
had argued that the fourth and fifth amendments taken together required that the unconsti-
tutionally procured evidence be suppressed in order to protect the right against self-incrimi-
nation, id. at 633, in Weeks the Court relied solely on fourth amendment grounds. 232 U.S.
[Vol. 34:213
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rule that were set forth in Elkins-deterrence of unconstitutional
police conduct and the imperative of judicial integrity-were also
relied upon in Mapp to support the extended application of the
exclusionary rule.32
B. From Mapp to Calandra: The Development of the
Deterrence Rationale
After establishing the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary
rule in Elkins and Mapp, the Court began to use that line of rea-
soning to limit the scope of the rule. For example, in Linkletter v.
Walker 3 the Court refused to apply the exclusionary rule retroac-
tively to reverse a conviction that had become final before the de-
cision in Mapp. The Court reasoned, in part, that exclusion of this
evidence would not further the deterrent purpose of the rule.3 Nor
did the considerations of privacy recognized in Mapp require ret-
roactive application of the exclusionary rule. The Court indicated
the primacy of the deterrent, as opposed to the compensatory,
function of the rule when it said that "[t]he ruptured privacy of
the victims' homes and effects cannot be restored. Reparation
comes too late. '3
5
Although the Court continued to cite the imperative of judicial
integrity as one basis for the exclusionary rule, by 1968 it had defi-
nitely come to perceive the "major thrust" of the exclusionary rule
at 389. In Mapp, however, the Court indicated that the combination of the fourth and fifth
amendments supported the exclusionary rule. 367 U.S. at 657.
32. 367 U.S. at 656, 660.
33. 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
34. Id. at 636-37. Linkletter illustrates the substantial difference between the analysis
used in deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule retroactively and the analysis em-
ployed in deciding whether to apply the rule in the more usual context. The Court explained
that in the former case it must look to "the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose
and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Id. at
629. In its retroactivity analysis, the Court emphasized, among other things, that the burden
on the administration of justice would be very high because hearings would have to be held
on the excludability of evidence long since destroyed. Finally, in the most noteworthy aspect
of the Linkletter opinion, the Court asserted that the retroactive application of the "coerced
confession" cases was not controlling because those cases "went to the fairness of the
trial-the very integrity of the fact-finding process," whereas in the exclusionary rule cases
"the fairness of the trial is not under attack." Id. at 639.
The approach taken by the Court in the retroactivity cases was more recently illus-
trated in United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), discussed in the text accompanying
notes 55-57 infra. For a discussion of the arguments concerning nonretroactive application
of criminal constitutional decisions, see Haddad, "Retroactivity Should Be Rethought": A
Call for the End of the Linkletter Doctrine, 60 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S. 417 (1969).
35. 381 U.S. at 637.
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as "a deterrent one."'36 With Alderman v. United States"7 the
Court began to measure the deterrent value of the exclusionary
rule, declining to extend the rule to a new class of defendants8
because of its finding that the additional deterrent value did not
outweigh the costs to society of suppressing relevant evidence.39
C. The Calandra Balancing Test
In United States v. Calandra40 the Court abandoned the "im-
perative of judicial integrity" and "constitutional requirement" ra-
tionales for the exclusionary rule. The Calandra Court asserted
that the exclusionary rule's sole purpose is to deter fourth amend-
ment violations and that the rule is a judicially created remedy
rather than a constitutional right.4 1 In declining to extend the ex-
clusionary rule to grand jury proceedings, the Court enunciated a
balancing test:
Against [the] potential damage to the role and functions of the grand
jury, we must weigh the benefits to be derived from this proposed extension
of the exclusionary rule....
Any incremental deterrent effect which might be achieved by extending
the rule to grand jury proceedings is uncertain at best .... We therefore
decline to embrace a view that would achieve a speculative and undoubtedlyminimal advance in the deterrence of police misconduct at the expense of
36. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12 (1968).
37. 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
38. In Alderman the Court refused to extend standing to contest a fourth amendment
violation to a codefendant whose own fourth amendment rights had not been violated by
the officials' conduct. In effect, the Alderman Court held that the exclusionary rule cannot
be asserted vicariously. Id. at 174. For a discussion of the exclusionary rule standing doc-
trine, see 64 CoRNsLL L. Rxv. 752 (1979).
39. 394 U.S. at 174-75. Two years after Alderman, in Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971)(Burger, C.J., dissenting), Chief Justice Burger expressed his view
that the costs to society of suppressing relevant evidence are far too high to be outweighed
by the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule. He argued that the empirical studies do not
show that the exclusionary rule deters unconstitutional police practices. The rule, he there-
fore concluded, should not be continued. Instead, he urged that a special court be estab-
lished in which people could bring claims against the government for damages resulting
from fourth amendment violations. Id. at 422-23. Citing the most exhaustive empirical study
of the exclusionary rule's deterrent value as the basis for his assertion that the rule does not
deter improper police acts, Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure,
37 U. CH. L. REv. 665 (1970), the Chief Justice stated that "[s]ome clear demonstration of
the benefits and effectiveness of the exclusionary rule is required to justify it in view of the
high price it extracts from society-the release of countless guilty criminals." 403 U.S. at
416. It has been argued, however, that Oaks did not conclude that the exclusionary rule does
not deter; he simply concluded that the evidence is inconclusive. See Cann & Egbert, supra
note 4, at 300-01.
40. 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
41. Id. at 348.
[Vol. 34:213
EXCLUSIONARY RULE
substantially impeding the role of the grand jury.2
In the cases that followed Calandra, the Court closely ex-
amined the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in deciding
whether to extend it to new settings. In United States v. Janis3
and Stone v. Powell44 the Court refrained from extending the rule,
finding that the additional deterrence would not outweigh the
costs to society of suppressing the evidence. In Janis the Court
was asked to extend the exclusionary rule to a federal civil pro-
ceeding in which evidence had been seized by state police officers
pursuant to a defective warrant. After examining the empirical
studies of the efficacy of the exclusionary rule and finding no con-
crete evidence concerning whether the rule deters unconstitutional
law enforcement practices, the Court applied the Calandra balanc-
ing test and declined to extend the scope of the rule:
If the exclusionary rule is the "strong medicine" that its proponents
claim it to be, then its use in the situations in which it is now applied...
must be assumed to be a substantial and efficient deterrent. Assuming this
efficacy, the additional marginal deterrence provided by forbidding a differ-
ent sovereign from using the evidence in a civil proceeding surely does not
outweigh the cost to society of extending the rule to that situation."
In dissent, Justice Stewart argued that the Court erred in con-
cluding that the additional deterrence was not significant enough
to justify such an extension of the exclusionary rule.47 He asserted
that the deterrent purpose of the rule would be frustrated by the
majority's decision, because state law enforcement officers could
circumvent fourth amendment requirements by handing evidence
over to federal officials for use in a civil trial.4 8
In Stone v. Powell the Court was urged to apply the exclusion-
ary rule to federal habeas corpus review. Rejecting such an exten-
sion, the Court reasoned that even assuming the deterrent value of
the rule "despite the lack of supportive empirical evidence," the
additional deterrent value of applying the rule in federal habeas
42. Id. at 350-52. In a footnote the Court stated that "[w]e have no occasion in the
present case to consider the extent of the rule's efficacy in criminal trials." Id. at 348, n.5.
The language in Calandra indicates that the Court did not have confidence in the remedial
value of the exclusionary rule in any context other than that of criminal trials.
43. 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
44. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
45. 428 U.S. at 453-54; 428 U.S. at 492-94.
46. 428 U.S. at 453-54.
47. Id. at 460.
48. Id. at 463-64. Justice Stewart based his argument on the same reasoning that led
the Court to overrule the "silver platter doctrine" in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206
(1960). 428 U.S. at 461-64. See text accompanying notes 22-27 supra.
1981] 219
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corpus proceedings would not be appreciable.4 9 The Chief Justice
concurred in the decision and added that the exclusionary rule
should be overruled or limited to cases involving egregious, bad
faith conduct.50 He pointed to the high costs of the rule to society
and the fact that "notwithstanding Herculean efforts, no empirical
study has been able to demonstrate that the rule does in fact have
any deterrent effect," as reasons for overruling or limiting the
rule.51 In dissent, Justice White suggested that the exclusionary
rule should not be applied when the law enforcement officer held a
reasonable, good faith belief that his conduct was lawful.5"
D. The Official's State of Mind
In the wake of Calandra, the Court began to scrutinize the
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule even in cases that did not
involve a proposed extension of the rule. One factor that became
relevant was the state of mind of the official at the time of the
illegal search and seizure. For example, in Michigan v. Tucker 5
the Court pointed out that because the police acted in good faith,
the deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule lost "much of its
force."" In United States v. Peltier55 the Court cited the lack of
deterrent value in refusing to apply the exclusionary rule retroac-
tively to a search later found to be unconstitutional. The Peltier
Court stated that if the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter
unconstitutional police conduct, then the rule should be applied
only if "the law enforcement officer had knowledge, or may prop-
erly be charged with knowledge, that the search was unconstitu-
49. 428 U.S. at 492-94.
50. Id. at 496, 501.
51. Id. at 499. The Chief Justice, however, did not assert that an empirical study has
definitely disproved the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule. Numerous commentators
have debated the rule's efficacy. See Canon, Is the Exclusionary Rule in Failing Health?
Some New Data and a Plea Against a Precipitous Conclusion, 62 Ky. L.J. 681 (1974); Ca-
non, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Critics Proven That It Doesn't Deter Police?, 62 JUD.
398 (1979); Schlesinger, The Exclusionary Rule: Have Proponents Proven That It Is a De-
terrent to Police?, 62 Jun. 404 (1979); Spiotto, Search and Seizure: An Empirical Study of
the Exclusionary Rule and Its Alternatives, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 243 (1973); Critique, On the
Limitations of Empirical Evaluations of the Exclusionary Rule: A Critique of the Spiotto
Research and United States v. Calandra, 69 Nw. U.L. REv. 740 (1974); 4 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PROB. 87 (1968). Empirical studies can be cited to support either position, but as a practical
matter the data is, at best, inconclusive. See Cann & Egbert, supra note 4.
52. 428 U.S. at 539-42 (White, J., dissenting).
53. 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
54. Id. at 447.
55. 422 U.S. 531 (1975).
[Vol. 34:213220
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tional under the Fourth Amendment."" Writing in dissent, Justice
Brennan expressed apprehension that the knowledge requirement
would be extended beyond the retroactivity question.57
In Brown v. Illinois" the Court again mentioned the state of
mind of the police officer as a factor to be weighed in deciding
whether to exclude unconstitutionally seized evidence. In Brown
the Court said that "particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the
official misconduct" are relevant.59 The Brown Court required ex-
clusion of evidence partly because the officer's illegal conduct had
a quality of purposefulness. ° The Court believed that the underly-
ing arrest was obviously illegal,61 and that it was necessary to ex-
clude the evidence seized pursuant to the arrest in order to deter
such conduct.' Justice Powell, concurring in Brown, contended
that the Court should focus on the state of mind of the police of-
ficer, and he set forth two categories of fouth amendment viola-
tions: "flagrantly abusive violations of fourth amendment rights"
and "'technical' Fourth Amendment violations. '6 4 Because Justice
Powell believed that the deterrent purpose of the rule assumes
that the police have acted willfully or negligently, he maintained
that the exclusionary rule should be applied only in the first cate-
gory of cases. 5
56. Id. at 542. The facts in Peltier revealed that government agents had been con-
ducting border patrol searches, without probable cause, within 100 miles of the border. After
the search in Peltier, the Court ruled in another case that the 100 mile interpretation of
border patrol authorization for unwarranted searches violated the fourth amendment Al-
meida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Defendant in Peltier sought to have
the Almeida-Sanchez ruling applied retroactively to his case. For a discussion of the Su-
preme Court's treatment of retroactive application of the exclusionary rule, see note 34
supra and accompanying text.
57. 422 U.S. at 544, 551.
58. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
59. Id. at 603-04.
60. Id. at 605.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 602-03. The decision in Brown comports with the "fruit of the poisonous
tree" doctrine under the exclusionary rule. This doctrine, which was established by the
Court in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920), requires the exclu-
sion of evidence (fruit) derived from evidence obtained in the underlying illegal search (the
poisonous tree). The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine has been limited by the Court
through several exceptions, including the attenuation doctrine, the inevitable discovery rule,
and the independent source rule. See 3 W. LAFAVE, supra note 4, at § 11.4(a).
The Supreme Court's focus in Brown on the state of mind of the police officer illus-
trates a growing tendency of the Court to consider the nature of the "taint" in determining
whether the evidence is the fruit of the poisonous tree. Id.
63. 422 U.S. at 610-12.
64. Id. at 610.
65. Id. at 610-12. The Court's focus on the police officer's state of mind was evident,
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Finally, in Michigan v. DeFillippo6 the Court based its deci-
sion not to apply the exclusionary rule upon the conclusion that
the officer acted in good faith. In DeFillippo the Court held that
evidence obtained from an arrest made in good faith reliance on an
ordinance later declared unconstitutional would not be sup-
pressed.67 Addressing the deterrence argument in a footnote, the
DeFillippo Court asserted that "no conceivable purpose of deter-
rence" would be served by applying the exclusionary rule in this
case since not even "the most zealous advocate of the exclusionary
rule" would wish to deter police "from enforcing a presumptively
valid statute." e The DeFillippo dissent argued that the Court had
erred in focusing on the good faith of the officer .6 According to the
dissent, the issue was whether the state had gathered evidence un-
lawfully.70 The dissent found that because the state could not con-
stitutionally authorize the arrest, the state should not be allowed
to defend the unconstitutional police activity by arguing that the
official was "merely executing the laws in good faith.
71
IH. THE GOOD FAITH EXCMTION TO THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE:
United States v. Williams
Although the Supreme Court has declined to apply the exclu-
sionary rule in some instances because it found the deterrent value
insufficient, until recently no court has limited the rule by a blan-
ket exception based solely upon lack of deterrent value. In United
States v. Williams72 the Fifth Circuit imposed such a blanket limi-
tation, holding that unconstitutionally seized evidence is admissi-
ble at trial provided that the officer who seized the evidence acted
pursuant to a reasonable, good faith belief that his actions were
although not controlling, in two more recent decisions that declined to apply the exclusion-
ary rule. United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), suggested that the Court's decision
not to require exclusion of evidence was bolstered by the fact that the officer did not intend
to violate the defendant's fourth amendment rights. See 47 CiN. L. REv. 487 (1978). In
United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979), the Court again emphasized that the official
had acted in good faith. The Court's tendency to designate certain offical action as being in
good faith, however, could lead to interpretive problems if the good faith exception is
adopted. See text accompanying notes 124-33 infra.
66. 443 U.S. 31 (1979).
67. Id. at 37-40. The Court pointed out that the Fifth Circuit also does not apply the
exclusionary rule in this context. Id. at 35.
68. Id. at 38, n.3.
69. Id. at 42 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 43 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).




In Williams a narcotics agent arrested defendant for violating
a bond condition. 4 In a search pursuant to that arrest, heroin was
found and later became the basis for an indictment. Defendant
moved to suppress the heroin found during the search. The district
court 75 granted the motion and the Fifth Circuit panel affirmed on
the grounds that a violation of a bond condition is not a criminal
offense justifying a warrantless arrest and on the grounds that the
officer did not have the statutory authority to make the arrest.7 6
The evidence obtained from a search pursuant to that arrest was
therefore excluded as the "fruit of the poisonous tree. 7 7 Dissent-
ing from the Fifth Circuit panel's decision, Justice Charles Clark
argued that the exclusionary rule should not be applied because
the officer held a reasonable, good faith belief that his actions were
authorized.7
On en banc rehearing, the Fifth Circuit found Justice Clark's
dissent persuasive and held that even if the arrest were unautho-
rized, the evidence must be admitted because the agent acted rea-
sonably and in good faith.7 9 The Williams court began its presen-
tation of the good faith exception by quoting a commentator's
description of the exception's proper scope. 0 According to that
commentator, good faith violations fall into two categories: "good
faith mistakes" and "technical violations." 8' A good faith mistake
occurs when an officer makes an error of judgment concerning
whether there is probable cause for his actions; 2 a technical viola-
tion occurs when an officer relies on a statute that is later declared
unconstitutional, a warrant that is later invalidated, or a court pre-
cedent that is later overruled." Within this framework, the Wil-
73. Id. at 840. See note 11 supra.
74. Id. The special agent in Williams had previously arrested defendant for "running"
drugs. Defendant was convicted of the offense. The agent, who knew that defendant was
free on bond with the condition that she remain in Ohio, saw her deplane from a nonstop
flight from Los Angeles while he was on duty at the Atlanta airport. Id.
75. The prosecution was brought in the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia.
76. 594 F.2d 86, 92-95 (5th Cir. 1979).
77. Id. at 95-96.
78. Id. at.97-98.
79. 622 F.2d at 840.
80. Id. at 840-41 (quoting Ball, Good Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The "Rea-
sonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. CaM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978)).
81. Id. at 635-36 (quoted at 622 F.2d at 840-41).
82. 622 F.2d at 841.
83. Id. The Williams court did not address the case of a warrant later invalidated. It
said that "no warrant is involved here, hence nothing that we say applies to factual situa-
19811
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liams court examined the precedents for the good faith exception,
focusing specifically on the two categories described above and
generally on the arguments for limiting the exclusionary rule.8'
Generally, the court reasoned that the exclusionary rule is no
longer coextensive with the. fourth amendment, but rather is a ju-
dicial rule designed to deter unconstitutional police practices.8 5 Ac-
cording to the Williams court, because the exclusionary rule pre-
vents the truth from being told and may free guilty criminals, it
must not be applied "in those contexts where it does not effec-
tively deter official misconduct."86 Good faith violations, the court
asserted, are not significantly deterred by the exclusionary rule.
87
Moreover, after examining recent cases in which the Supreme
Court had refused to extend the scope of the exclusionary rule, the
court concluded that the deterrent effect of the rule in the context
of good faith violations was no greater than the deterrent value
found unconvincing by the Supreme Court.8 Thus, the court rea-
soned that since the Supreme Court found the deterrence value too
slight to justify applying the rule in those decisions, the deterrence
value was also too slight in the good faith context.8 "
The Williams court then surveyed the authority for the good
faith exception in both the "technical violation" and "good faith
mistake" permutations. The court cited DeFillippo9o and Peltier1
tions where one has been obtained." Id. at 840 n.1.
84. Id. at 840-46.
85. Id. at 841.
86. Id. at 842.
87. Id. The court based this assertion in part on the reasoning presented in Justice
Clark's dissent from the panel decision. Clark had said that excluding evidence seized in
good faith may deter police officers from acting at all. He explained that police officers fre-
quently need to make quick decisions and often do not know that their actions are wrongful.
594 F.2d at 97-98. The court also cited United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976), for the
conclusion that good faith is a factor that significantly reduces deterrence. Finally, the court
quoted Justice White's dissent in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 540 (1976), in which he
argued that the good faith exception should be adopted because the exclusionary rule does
not deter good faith violations.
88. 622 F.2d at 842-43. The court cited Supreme Court decisions that fall within the
following categories: first, a refusal to extend the exclusionary rule to a new context, United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974); second, a refusal to apply the rule retroactively,
United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); third, a refusal to apply the rule to impeach-
ment (coupled with retention of the rule on direct examination), Harris v. New York, 401
U.S. 222 (1971); and last, a holding that the violation in question fit into an exception to the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
89. 622 F.2d at 842-43.
90. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979); see notes 66-71 supra and accompany-
ing text.
91. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); see notes 55-57 supra and accompa-
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to support the application of the exception to technical viola-
tions."1 The court stated that DeFillippo allowed the use of evi-
dence obtained pursuant to an arrest under a statute later invali-
dated and that Peltier allowed the use of evidence obtained during
a search authorized by a statutory construction later held uncon-
stitutional.9 3 As precedent for applying the exception to good faith
mistakes, the Williams court relied on Janis"4 and Tucker.'5 Ac-
cording to the court, Janis and Tucker allowed the admission of
unconstitutionally seized evidence because in both cases the of-
ficers had acted reasonably and in good faith." Concluding, the
court emphasized that the good faith exception is appropriate be-
cause the exclusionary rule does not deter police conduct that is
believed at the time, reasonably and in good faith, to be lawful. 7
Concurring, Justice Hill stressed the importance of requiring
objective good faith in the application of the good faith excep-
tion.'8 He explained that an objective standard of reasonableness
would require "that law enforcement personnel acquaint them-
selves with" constitutional requirements "and be disposed towards
respecting them."" According to Justice Hill, the good faith excep-
tion, administered under an objective good faith standard, would
not reward ignorance of constitutional limitations on police con-
duct, but instead would encourage learning.
00
Justice Rubin, joined by nine other members of the court,
wrote a separate opinion criticizing the majority for its adoption of
the good faith exception.101 Asserting that the court based its deci-
sion solely on the deterrence rationale, he argued that although de-
terrence is "an important reason for the rule," it is not its only
nying text.
92. 622 F.2d at 843. The Williams court also relied on Fifth Circuit decisions that
supported the technical violations facet of the good faith exception. See note 67 supra and
accompanying text.
93. 622 F.2d at 843.
94. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976); see notes 45-48 supra and accompany-
ing text.
95. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); see notes 53-54 supra and accompanying
text. The court also relied on the following Fifth Circuit decisions: United States v. Wolffs,
594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Hill, 500 F.2d 315 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 931 (1975).
96. 622 F.2d at 844-45.
97. Id. at 847.
98. Id. at 847-48.





basis.102 Relying on Weeks,10 3 Mapp,'0° and Justice Brennan's dis-
sent in Calandra,05 he contended that the "imperative of judicial
integrity" is a fundamental justification for the exclusionary
rule.ls He also observed that efforts had been made to justify the
rule by pointing to the relationship between the fourth amendment
and the self-incrimination clause of the fifth amendment.
07
IV. ANALYSIS
The Fifth Circuit in Williams properly identified the purpose
of the exclusionary rule as deterrence. Calandra and its progeny
demonstrate that deterrence is the only judicially accepted justifi-
cation for the exclusionary rule. 08 The battle over other purposes
for the rule, illustrated in Justice Rubin's concurrence, is now just
an academic exercise. The Fifth Circuit also correctly concluded
that the Supreme Court's decision in DeFillippo laid the ground-
work for the good faith exception in cases involving a statute later
declared unconstitutional.' It is clear that the Court would ap-
prove of the good faith exception in such a case. Nevertheless, the
Fifth Circuit went beyond current Supreme Court case law in de-
ciding that any reasonable good faith mistake would be excused.
Supreme Court cases do focus on the good faith of police of-
ficers," 0 but they do not refrain from applying the rule simply be-
cause the officer acted in good faith."'
Although "deterrence" is an elusive term, it is clear that the
102. Id. at 849.
103. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); see notes 12-16 supra and accompa-
nying text.
104. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); see notes 28-32 supra and accompanying text.
105. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974); see notes 40-42 supra and
accompanying text.
106. 622 F.2d at 849 (quoting 367 U.S. at 659).
107. Id. at 850.
108. See text accompanying notes 40-42 supra.
109. See text accompanying notes 66-68 supra.
110. See notes 53-65 supra and accompanying text.
111. For example, in Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975), the majority stated that
the purpose and flagrancy of the official misconduct were relevant in the determination
whether to apply the exclusionary rule. The Court, however, did not consider the nature of
the violation solely. This fact prompted Justice Powell to file a concurrence in which he
argued that the Court should base the exclusionary rule decision entirely on the nature of
the violation. See notes 58-65 supra and accompanying text. Similarly, in Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465 (1976), the Court did not base its decision not to extend the exclusionary rule
solely on the official's good faith. This was evidenced by the fact that Justice White asserted




deterrence rationale for the exclusionary rule cannot be served by
excluding evidence obtained in reliance on a statute later declared
unconstitutional. Police reasonably rely on authority granted by
statute. Exclusion of evidence because it was gathered pursuant to
a statute that was later held unconstitutional would not deter po-
lice from gathering evidence pursuant to other statutes that might
later be invalidated. This reasoning led the DeFillippo Court, and
the Fifth Circuit in Williams, to conclude that the exclusionary
rule should not apply in that context.11
The Williams court placed the DeFillippo exception in the
category of "technical violations," which also included the ob-
taining of evidence in reliance on a statutory interpretation later
held invalid.1 3 The court relied on Peltier in asserting that the
Supreme Court would support the good faith exception in such a
situation.1 14 In Peltier, however, the Supreme Court based its deci-
sion upon retroactivity concerns.1 5 Peltier is therefore not direct
authority for the extension of the good faith exception to the stat-
utory construction setting. More careful consideration is necessary
in deciding whether an arrest made pursuant to an invalid statu-
tory construction should be excepted from the exclusionary rule. A
serious problem could arise if the exception were so applied. Al-
though it is relatively simple to determine that an officer acted rea-
sonably in relying on a currently valid statute as in DeFillippo, it
would not be so simple to determine whether a particular statutory
construction was reasonable. When courts have interpreted a stat-
ute in the same way many times,'16 and the officer's conduct com-
ported with that interpretation, the reasonableness of his actions is
clear. In a case like Williams, however, there may be no court pre-
cedent that would help determine whether the officer's interpreta-
tion of a statute was reasonable.11 7 If the good faith exception were
112. Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. at 38, n.3; United States v. William, 622 F.2d at
843. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra. The Fifth Circuit recognized that DeFillippo
authorized the good faith exception in the case of an arrest made in good faith reliance on a
statute later held unconstitutional. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d at 843.
113. Id. at 843. See text accompanying notes 83, 91-93 supra. The Court, however, did
not address the "warrant later invalidated" facet of the technical violation exception. See
note 83 supra.
114. 622 F.2d at 843.
115. 422 U.S. at 536-39. See notes 55-57 supra and accompanying text. See note 34
supra for an explanation of the Court's approach to the question whether to apply the ex-
clusionary rule retroactively.
116. See, e.g., Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), discussed in
note 56 supra.
117. In Williams the Court demonstrated this problem when it stated that "[t]his cir-
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applied to the statutory construction cases, it would need to be
limited to cases in which there is clear judicial precedent support-
ing the officer's conduct. The exception in that instance would not
frustrate the exclusionary rule's deterrent value. Future police of-
ficers would not be deterred from complying with one well-estab-
lished statutory interpretation simply because another statutory
construction was held unconstitutional.
The "good faith mistake" category of the Williams good faith
exception, by contrast, would frustrate the deterrent purpose of
the exclusionary rule. The Williams court described a good faith
mistake as an error of judgment concerning whether sufficient facts
exist to constitute probable cause for a given police measure, such
as a warrantless arrest.118 The court based that facet of the good
faith exception on a determination that police cannot be deterred
from making reasonable mistakes.1 9 This conclusion tacitly as-
sumes that police cannot learn the requirements of the fourth
amendment from the mistakes of others. The deterrence rationale
for the exclusionary rule, however, necessarily assumes that future
police will learn of the exclusion of evidence because of specific
police practices and, consequently, will not engage in those prac-
tices themselves."10 By contrast, if an officer were allowed to show
that he made a reasonable good faith mistake, a court, applying
the good faith exception, would not exclude the evidence. 1 Future
police officers then would not learn that the conduct in question
did not satisfy constitutional requirements. If they learned any-
thing, they would learn that reasonable mistakes do not violate the
cuit at the time of the arrest had not ruled that a person violating bail requirements, but
not a court appearance date, could or could not be arrested on that basis, and the only
circuit that had inferentially done so had sustained the conviction." 622 F.2d at 841 (foot-
note omitted). Although the Williams court made this statement in support of the good
faith exception, it would seem that if so little authority were available, it would be difficult
to determine that the officer's actions were reasonable.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 842. See text accompanying note 97 supra.
120. See text accompanying note 26 supra.
121. In fact, under the Fifth Circuit's holding it appears that a court applying the
good faith exception would not necessarily have to rule on the question whether the conduct
in question violated the fourth amendment. The Williams court's language regarding the
procedure for establishing a good faith mistake seems to require that the court first rule on
the fourth amendment issue and then rule on the question of good faith. 622 F.2d at 846-47.
The language, however, is not sufficiently clear to compel such an approach. See note 11
supra. This procedural problem is particularly troublesome when one considers that the
development of a body of law concerning the requirements of the fourth amendment would
be retarded if a court did not have to rule on the fourth amendment question before ruling
on the good faith question.
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fourth amendment. On the other hand, if evidence were excluded
because a police officer's judgment was incorrect, other officers
would be deterred from making the same error. Assuming that the
exclusionary rule deters unconstitutional practices in its current
form,112 there would eventually be a decrease in such mistakes.
This analysis contradicts Justice Hill's remark that the good faith
exception would encourage learning;123 indeed, the exception would
significantly reduce the opportunity to learn.
Finally, the good faith exception presents dangers in adminis-
tration. Supreme Court cases that have termed certain police acts
"good faith" conduct illustrate the potential problems. In Brown v.
Illinois14 the majority found that the officer's conduct evidenced a
quality of purposefulness and was obviously illegal, 2 5 but Justice
Powell in dissent suggested that the officer might have had a rea-
sonable good faith belief that his actions were lawful.12 6 In United
States v. Ceccolini"7 the majority emphasized that the police of-
ficer did not intend to violate the fourth amendment;" 8 dissenting,
Justice Marshall asserted that the search was clearly illegal.'" The
most disturbing example of the dangers of the good faith approach,
however, appears in United States v. Carceres.3 0 In that case an
Internal Revenue Service agent applied for authorization that he
knew was required before he could monitor a conversation. He ar-
ranged a meeting with defendant and monitored the conversation
before the required authorization came through.'13 The Carceres
majority called this action a good faith violation. 3 2 The dissent
disagreed, pointing out that the agent had control over the timing
122. Because the empirical evidence does not establish that the exclusionary rule does
or does not deter police misconduct, see note 51 supra, it is as reasonable to assume that the
rule does deter as to assume that it does not.
123. United States v. Williams, 622 F.2d 830, 848 (5th Cir. 1980) (Hill, J., concurring).
124. 422 U.S. 590 (1975).
125. Id. at 605. The officer in Brown made an illegal arrest without probable cause or a
warrant, but read the defendant his Miranda rights. Id. at 591.
126. Id. at 612.
127. 435 U.S. 268 (1978).
128. Id. at 279-80.
129. Id. at 289-90. The police officer in Ceccolini, while off duty, saw an envelope be-
hind the counter at a friend's store. Without permission he looked inside it, found incrimi-
nating evidence, and asked his friend who owned the envelope. This discovery led to an
indictment of the person whom the officer's friend had identified. Id. at 269-70. The testi-
mony of the officer's friend was found to be admissible under the attenuation exception to
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine. Id. at 279.
130. 440 U.S. 741 (1979).
131. Id. at 748.
132. Id. at 757.
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of the conversation but nevertheless failed to comply with agency
regulations. 13 - This Recent Development submits that the determi-
nation whether an officer acted in good faith does not lend itself to
an objective standard and hence could be subject to considerable
abuse. Thus, adoption of a good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule could result in an inconsistent application of the rule.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court does not believe that the deterrent value
of the exclusionary rule is sufficiently well established to merit
broadening the rule's scope.13 The Court nonetheless has not yet
carved out a blanket exception to the rule based solely on a lack of
deterrent value. The Fifth Circuit decided in Williams that the ex-
clusionary rule is not an effective deterrent in the good faith mis-
take or technical violations cases. It therefore removed these
fourth amendment violations from exclusionary rule doctrine. Al-
though the Fifth Circuit correctly reasoned that the Supreme
Court would support the exception in the case of police reliance on
a statute later declared unconstitutional, the Fifith Circuit went
too far in holding that deterrence considerations and Supreme
Court precedent supported inclusion of good faith mistakes within
the ambit of the exception.
The empirical studies regarding the efficacy of the exclusion-
ary rule as a deterrent are inconclusive.13 5 Nevertheless, the Su-
preme Court assumes that the exclusionary rule does deter at least
some unconstitutional police conduct in its present application.
1 3 6
Because it has not been determined whether the exclusionary rule
deters such practices, and because the foregoing analysis has
shown that the exclusionary rule could deter good faith mis-
takes,1 37 this Recent Development urges that future courts should
133. Id. at 766 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent presented a forceful criticism of
the good faith exception:
Restricting application of the exclusionary rule to instances of bad faith would invite
law enforcement officials to gamble that courts would grant absolution for all but the
most egregious conduct. Since judges do not lightly cast aspersions on the motives of
government officials, the suppression doctrine would be relegated to those rare circum-
stances where a litigant can prove insolent or calculated indifference to agency
regulations.
Id. at 766.
134. See text accompanying notes 42, 45-46 supra.
135. See note 51 supra.
136. See United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976); text accompanying note
46 supra.
137. See text accompanying notes 121-23 supra.
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not adopt the good faith mistake aspect of the Fifth Circuit's good
faith exception to the exclusionary rule. The administrative
problems inherent in applying the exception to good faith mistakes
reinforce this conclusion. Of course, it would still be open to the
prosecution to argue that the harm to society from extending the
exclusionary rule to a new setting would outweigh the deterrent
effect on fourth amendment violations. Nevertheless, the categori-
cal exception carved out in Williams is much too sweeping and in-
discriminate and should not replace the balancing process that de-
termines the scope of the rule.
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